Commitment

Part 1: Public Commitment

The Structure of Commitment

To begin I would like to present a model of commitment. Commitment is the restriction of one’s freedom or potentiality in order to achieve some end. All acts by their very nature are commitments to something instead of something else. We are, as humans, always fundamentally acting towards some end or projecting towards a possible state of affairs[1], which entails that we are not free to do otherwise in that act. Only in acting (and in no other way) do we make transparent what our commitments actually are. For example, the amount one gets out and swims, cycles, and runs is a commitment to being able to finish or participate in a triathlon. Likewise, failing to undertake this training is itself a commitment towards (probably) not finishing or participating in a triathlon. While this is somewhat obvious, where it becomes interesting is the interaction between verbal enunciations of said commitments (which is still an act) and the credibility of it as a signal, perceived by others.

All acts (even negatively defined) are fundamentally acts towards some end instead of another; this is commitment.

Verbal Commitments as Signals

In order to make clear our intentions and communicate with others in everyday living, we make proclamations such as “I will do x", for example. We do this not to substitute the more concrete form of acting and doing, but to be economic with our time or to signal to others that we are a certain kind of person that does certain things, without having to actually go out and do them in front of people. We could hardly function as we do at without these verbal shortcuts.

The unfortunate part about it though is that verbal commitments have the peculiar translucency that means that they can overstate or understate what one’s actual commitments are. In other words, verbal commitments have the power to claim much more or less than their action actually entails. This gives rise to a serious problem: people can, at low cost, deploy verbal commitment to imitate greater commitment than one is comfortably willing to restrict their freedom for. Ask yourself why we often dismiss politicians’ verbal commitment to policy change as disingenuous, they can say whatever they want and often we see no substantial change (whether there is a change or not). Why? Because verbal commitments alone fail the “costly-to-fake principle.”[2] It states that signals fail to be credible if they are easy or cost-free to fake. There arises a need to test the validity of verbal commitments according to their context and whether they map to a person’s prior action.

Verbal commitments are a social shortcut in which we can signal commitments, but are low-cost and easily imitated, meaning we require a criterion for credibility.

Commitment Criterion

As a result of the imitation problem, the effectiveness of a verbal commitment regresses back to either (a) the context of such an utterance, and the extent to which the one restricts their own freedom in doing so or (b) whether that person (in the observer’s mind) has appropriately demonstrated their commitment already through prior action. Not unless some part of you visibly incurs some risk, or, actually tightens their potentiality for future freedoms and possibilities can it be genuine.

(a)   Verbal Commitment in Context

Remember our politician friend. Most people fail to see many claims of theirs as credible as it is not like their job or livelihood is at risk if they fail to come through with it – they have no ‘skin in the game.’[3] On the other hand, take a public verbal denunciation of the state in mainland China. This is a powerful commitment through ‘mere’ verbalization, not because she just claims it to be, but because in doing so she makes it credible by risking punishment in the form of imprisonment or death. The context of a verbal commitment can itself be the grounds for making credible one’s commitments.

(b)   Verbal Commitment Measured against Prior Action

The other way in which verbal commitments are made credible is by measuring it against prior action. An example of this is those publicly “committed” to preventing climate change. It is very easy to gauge actual levels of commitment on this issue. There are those who substantially change their diet, use their vote to attempt to enact change, use reusable containers, cups, and bags and at every point they can. And there are those who post long Instagram stories of ironic signs at climate marches yet still fail to make any sort of real change in their life that restricts what they already do. The greater one is willing to, and has, risked their freedom for their commitments the more credible they become.

What is common in these cases that commitment transcends mere words. Concrete action provides a much firmer basis for signaling what one’s commitments truly are.[4] As discussed at the start, all actions are the sole designator of commitment. You are not committed to donating to charity if you don’t donate to charity, nor can you claim not to be committed to donate charity if you consistently do.

The credibility of verbal commitments as signals is determined by risk (as the continued pursuit of one end at the expense of others) incurred within the context.

Public commitment credibility maps proportionally to how much one is willing to incur risk (restrict their potentiality) in pursuit of the commitment.

A Word on Signal Relativism

The way I have been talking about it makes it sound like there is a hard and fast way of determining ‘true’ commitment from false, but this is not true. There are virtually endless possibilities about how an action will be interpreted by observers due to our differing psychology and priors. The credence signals are given are therefore in some sense relative. For example, take the politician. Their claim to bring about prosperity will likely be taken as highly credible by those already predisposed to that politicians’ goals, party, or ideology. A sworn enemy will see it as baseless platitudes or even literal lies.

A crucial distinction to be made here though is the relativism of the verbal and the concrete commitment. A verbal commitment due to its failure to track actual commitment and ease to imitate means that, by its very nature, it can be interpreted and taken in an endless variety of ways. Concrete determinate action leaves much less room for interpretation. While a political speech can be interpreted in an endless variety of ways that lead to accusations of lying, dog-whistles, or even profundity means there aren’t totally valid ways of assessing such a speech. On the other hand, a politician actually making good (or bad) on their promises gives us a better sense in which we can validate commitments. The number of houses built under ‘Kiwibuild’ is a better measure of government commitment to housing than the verbal election promises made. A suspected unfaithful husband claiming commitment to their spouse means credibility is up in the air, walking in on him having sex with someone else says a whole lot more about his actual commitment.

The credibility of a commitment is relative to the observer, but the concrete action leaves much less to be interpreted than the verbal commitment.

A Case Study: Judah's Folly

I think some scenes from Woody Allen’s Crimes and Misdemeanors are particularly relevant. Martin Landau’s character cheats on his wife and claims that he “promised her nothing” which he may not have verbally – but he questions whether his actions say otherwise. I mean, he spent two years scheming behind his wife’s back to be with her. That’s going to say a lot more than any verbal commitment will. They both spent that time with each other, rather than pursuing other ends (sacrificing their potentiality). Landau’s character is constantly trying to tell himself, and his mistress, that it was never like that but the credibility of that crumbles when she thinks back to all that time spent together. That being said the mistress could clearly see he had not left his wife after all this time (contrary to his claims) and ought to have known his true commitment to her was never going to be what she wanted.

This is a case of Judah under determining commitment verbally as a way of rationalising the relationship to himself, but also overdetermining in the sense that he said enough to keep her on the line but never fully committed to her.

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[1] Heidegger’s notion of “Care” is the influence here.

[2] Robert Frank’s book Passions Within Reasons discusses this.

[3] From Nicholas Nassim Taleb's Skin in the Game.

[4] What is called revealed preferences in economics is like this. It says that actual purchasing habits provide a better ground for predictions than rational utility or self-report, as concrete action is a stronger signal of commitment to what consumers want.