Why Platonism?

Why make so much of fragmentary blue
In here and there a bird, or butterfly,
Or flower, or wearing-stone, or open eye,
When heaven presents in sheets the solid hue?

Since earth is earth, perhaps, not heaven (as yet)--
Though some savants make earth include the sky;
And blue so far above us comes so high,
It only gives our wish for blue a whet.

          — Robert Frost

Why would anyone ever believe in Platonism, the view that there are transcendent 'forms' that exist over and above spatiotemporal reality, that are somehow supposed to explain it? This essay is an attempt to answer that question.

One natural view about truth is to think that for some claim to be true, there must be something in the world that makes it true. For example, it seems true that ‘Rowan likes coffee’ because I do, in fact, like coffee. ‘Grass is green’ is true because grass is, in fact, green. Of course, the case of colour (like everything else) becomes complicated: what exactly do we mean by ‘green’ and what is it for something, like grass, to be green?

Of those that attempt to explain this seeming fact, different stories could be told. But however this is done, there will be some reality that makes the fact true. For example, one view might say that ‘green’ refers to the surface properties of physical bodies that reflect light within a certain range of wavelengths. This view says that ‘grass is green’ is true because the properties of grass mean light is reflected in just this way. Another view says that green is a specific qualitative character of experience, one that is not part of the physical world. Such a view can nonetheless say that our statement ‘grass is green’ is still true because we perceive grass and in perceiving it, our experience is of this specific character. Finally, another view thinks that grass is green because grass has the power to produce green sensations in us. This power that grass has to make us have a certain kind of sensation is what makes ‘grass is green’ is true. In each case, once we settle the interpretation of ‘green’ we find that there is some reality it refers to that makes claims like ‘grass is green’ true. This general view of truth is called the ‘truthmaker’ view, which basically says that every truth has a truthmaker. I think the view is basically right. And even if it is not exactly right, I think it at least constitutes the right kind of attitude we should take towards doing metaphysics – an attitude that thinks truth does not come reality-free.

On The Validity of Normative Life

Just had another essay published with Epoche, this time on Habermas' discourse ethics. Enjoy:

On the Validity of Normative Life: Habermas' Discourse Ethics

https://epochemagazine.org/64/on-the-validity-of-normative-life-habermas-discourse-ethics/

The Phenomenological Papers IV: The Malady of Memory

This is the fourth essay in my series, The Phenomenological Papers, a series of essays on topics in phenomenology and metaphysics. You can find the first essay here, the second here, and the third here. This one discusses the phenomenology of time, and how we should respond to the facts presented to us in temporal experience. I don't argue for it here, but there is an ontology implicit to this that I basically endorse.

I. The future is essentially experienced as something that is open. For example, tomorrow I will eat lunch, even though I have not yet decided what I will eat. What will come to be, how the world will come to exist—that is, what I will eat—will be subject, at least in part, to my choice. We go about every day imagining the outcome of such choices, before we make them. Of course, I will be hungry is not up to my choice, nor are a lot of other things. But a whole lot else is. And it is in these things which our experience of the future as being open consists. We experience imagined possibilities in a kind of nascent state, as a set of paths we can choose to bring about, or not, rather than as something already real. They are not possibilities we do actually have to encounter, but only could, or might.

However, note that it is not sufficient to characterise our experience of the future by merely saying that it ‘could’ happen, because otherwise contingent events from our past would feel the same way, as they only ‘could’ have happened themselves. It might have happened that I chose a different place to live or won the lottery. These past possibilities, nor the fact that they did not happen, which were equally contingent, are not experienced as something that is open in the same way. Indeed, we even experience future events that are ‘inevitable’ (that we are certain or near certain will occur) as open, like ‘the last day of the present year.’ These events are experienced as certainly coming to be, as necessary, but still as something open in the sense I am putting forward. 

How to Wield Ockham's Razor (A Dialogue and Commentary)

Unius: ...another benefit of physicalism is that it is more parsimonious than dualism.

Dualis: So what if it is parsimonious? It denies something that is undeniable: the existence of conscious experience.

Unius: Seriously? How many times do I have to say that I am not denying that we have conscious experience? I am just saying that it does not require an autonomous realm of entities to be postulated in order to explain it. Our awareness of the world is physical—just like everything else!

Dualis: Yeah, okay, you say that, but...you know what, whatever, we've had this debate a thousand times. Let's talk about something else. What were you saying about parsimony?

Unius: Okay, sure. All I meant was: putting our explanatory differences aside, would you not admit, at least, that considerations of parsimony count in favour of physicalism?

Dualis: What do you mean? I don't care if something is parsimonious if it denies something fundamental.

Unius: I know, I know, but is it not at least regrettable that you must postulate two kinds of fundamental entity, rather than one? Should we not prefer, if we know absolutely nothing else about two theories, the simpler one?

On Moral Reason

I. In Jeffrie G. Murphy's article "Marxism and Retribution", he accuses Rawls of illegitimately presupposing an unargued for and substantive view about what it is rational for one to do, in setting out his account of justice. This presupposition, then, in part, illegitimately determines the outcome of his theory. More specifically, he argues that it is the presupposition of a (merely) historically contingent form of reason. What does this accusation actually amount to? I take it that this accusation is primarily targeted at Rawls' argument for his principles of justice from the original position. 


II. Rawls' original position is a thought experiment that is supposed to bring out our most considered judgements about what justice is, and how we ought to design society. The SEP (because I am not trying to do Rawls' exegesis) describes it as follows:

The Phenomenological Papers III: Music, Art for the Soul

This is the third essay in my series, The Phenomenological Papers, a series of essays on similar topics in phenomenology and metaphysics. You can find the first essay here, and the second here. Unlike the first and second essays in this series, this one is completely new and a culmination of a few different things I have been working on and thinking about: metaphysics, phenomenology, and aesthetics, all in one. It is my attempt at a philosophical anthropology as well as something it can hopefully explain: our enjoyment of music. It is perhaps the most enigmatic thing I have written, so hopefully it makes sense to people. I have published it with Epoché so just supply the link. Enjoy!

Music, Art for the Soul

epochemagazine.org/59/music-art-for-the-soul/

Phenomenological Papers II: Art & Self-Consciousness

This is the second essay in my series, The Phenomenological Papers, a series of essays on similar topics. You can find the first essay here. Like the first, this is also an old essay that I have substantively revised, so much so, in fact, that the original is unrecognisable in it. This, and the next essay, will be on something I have long been preoccupied with: the experience of art. Not totally happy with the formulation, but I hope you enjoy.

The universal need for expression in art lies…in man’s rational impulse to exalt the inner and outer world into a spiritual consciousness for himself, as an object in which he recognises his own self. He satisfies the need of this spiritual freedom when he makes all that exists explicit for himself within, and in a corresponding way realises this his explicit self without, evoking thereby, in this reduplication of himself, what is in him into vision and into knowledge for his own mind and that of others.

– G.W.F. Hegel

I. There is always an apparent tension between our seemingly complex and infinitely extensive inner life and our ability to deliberately express it in such a way that we feel adequately represented in the world. At any given moment in our lives, it feels as though, even within the blink of an eye, a culmination of memories, thoughts, and emotions flood through us – arbitrating and adjudicating our action. We sometimes tend to see this ocean of subjectivity as something of our ‘true selves’ or as our true and complete feelings about things. Consequently, we have a fundamental desire to represent this in the world, especially to others, whose recognition we desire. We want to feel understood by those around us – to have our ‘private’ subjectivity recognised as legitimate in a world of objects.

What do I mean by ‘legitimate’ here? Something is legitimate to us, in this sense, if there is some external validation of its existence by other persons or by an object that is independent of us, not just ourselves or our own impression of things. For example, suppose that at night I see a bright light flash across the sky that is unlike anything I have seen before, but I’m the only one who saw it. In situations like these, we feel torn because no one else was there to validate or invalidate our perception of this flash, nor can it be integrated into our prior beliefs. “Am I crazy, what was that?” you might think. We desire an explanation of this phenomenon because we are certain that it happened, that we saw something, but uncertain why and wish to settle it through some process of external validation. There are a couple of ways this could go. There could be an external explanation or an internal explanation, and it could be validated either by persons, or by further objects.

Rowan Recommends: Reviewing The 2022 Sight and Sound Top 100

Recently, Sight and Sound released their most recent 'greatest films of all time' list. Every ten years, they ask "critics, programmers, curators, archivists and academics" their top ten favourite films and aggregate the results. Putting aside the thorny issue of whether this list is tracking anything real (I think it surely is), this list is a great guide for getting into great cinema. I highly recommend leafing through the results for a film you like the sound of and watching it. For myself, I think the list is a mix of some of the greatest movies of all time and, to be honest, some overrated ones as well. 

In this post, I do four things. First, I list my 25 favourite picks from the list, which will be my own recommendations if you dive into it. Second, I list picks that I think are overrated. Third, I briefly mention some notable omissions. Finally, I list my top 10 favourite movies of all time, and some honourable mentions. Note that I have not quite seen all of them and that any omissions from my list do not mean I do not love them as well, just that I do not love them enough to be in the top 25.

My Philosophical Views (Answering the 2020 PhilPapers Survey)

In 2020, PhilPapers ran a survey. Here is a description of this survey:

...the 2020 PhilPapers Survey...surveyed the philosophical views of 1785 English-speaking philosophers from around the world on 100 philosophical questions.

The 2020 PhilPapers Survey was a follow-up to the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. The 2020 survey increased the number of the questions from 30 to 100 and expanded the target population.

And here are its results. In this post, I will be writing my own answers to the survey. I will only answer those questions I feel strongly enough about answering. Thus, some will be missing. Given my unorthodox metaphysical views, some of the positions/questions are technically nonsense to me, but I will answer each of those as if they were not. Also, I will include the percentage ratio of people that agree with me (including 'accept' and 'lean toward') in brackets after each answer. It goes without saying that I think some of the questions are badly posed, insufficiently precise, and don't allow for unorthodox views, etc. I am just going to pick what seems right for me. And finally, I am much more confident here than I would be in actually answering it, so I do not have a fully worked-out view of many of these questions. I will post any changes to my views next year! Here goes: