1 And it came to pass after these things, that God did tempt Abraham, and said unto him, Abraham: and he said, Behold, here I am.2 And he said, Take now thy son, thine only son Isaac, whom thou lovest, and get thee into the land of Moriah; and offer him there for a burnt offering upon one of the mountains which I will tell thee of.3 And Abraham rose up early in the morning, and saddled his ass, and took two of his young men with him, and Isaac his son, and clave the wood for the burnt offering, and rose up, and went unto the place of which God had told him.4 Then on the third day Abraham lifted up his eyes, and saw the place afar off.5 And Abraham said unto his young men, Abide ye here with the ass; and I and the lad will go yonder and worship, and come again to you.6 And Abraham took the wood of the burnt offering, and laid it upon Isaac his son; and he took the fire in his hand, and a knife; and they went both of them together.7 And Isaac spake unto Abraham his father, and said, My father: and he said, Here am I, my son. And he said, Behold the fire and the wood: but where is the lamb for a burnt offering?8 And Abraham said, My son, God will provide himself a lamb for a burnt offering: so they went both of them together.9 And they came to the place which God had told him of; and Abraham built an altar there, and laid the wood in order, and bound Isaac his son, and laid him on the altar upon the wood.10 And Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to slay his son.11 And the angel of the Lord called unto him out of heaven, and said, Abraham, Abraham: and he said, Here am I.12 And he said, Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou any thing unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son from me.
Ruminations
Monday, November 18, 2024
In Praise of Caravaggio’s The Sacrifice of Isaac
Friday, May 24, 2024
Between Subjectivity & Objectivity: The Desiderata of Any Future Ethics
Saturday, March 2, 2024
A Review of The Sound & The Fury, by William Faulkner
Sunday, October 8, 2023
Why Platonism?
Why make so much of fragmentary blue
In here and there a bird, or butterfly,
Or flower, or wearing-stone, or open eye,
When heaven presents in sheets the solid hue?Since earth is earth, perhaps, not heaven (as yet)--
Though some savants make earth include the sky;
And blue so far above us comes so high,
It only gives our wish for blue a whet.
— Robert Frost
Why would anyone ever believe in Platonism, the view that there are transcendent 'forms' that exist over and above spatiotemporal reality, that are somehow supposed to explain it? This essay is an attempt to answer that question.
One natural view about
truth is to think that for some claim to be true, there must be something in
the world that makes it true. For example, it seems true that ‘Rowan likes
coffee’ because I do, in fact, like coffee. ‘Grass is green’ is true because
grass is, in fact, green. Of course, the case of colour (like everything else)
becomes complicated: what exactly do we mean by ‘green’ and what is it for
something, like grass, to be green?
Of those that attempt to explain this seeming fact, different stories could be told. But however this is done, there will be some reality that makes the fact true. For example, one view might say that ‘green’ refers to the surface properties of physical bodies that reflect light within a certain range of wavelengths. This view says that ‘grass is green’ is true because the properties of grass mean light is reflected in just this way. Another view says that green is a specific qualitative character of experience, one that is not part of the physical world. Such a view can nonetheless say that our statement ‘grass is green’ is still true because we perceive grass and in perceiving it, our experience is of this specific character. Finally, another view thinks that grass is green because grass has the power to produce green sensations in us. This power that grass has to make us have a certain kind of sensation is what makes ‘grass is green’ is true. In each case, once we settle the interpretation of ‘green’ we find that there is some reality it refers to that makes claims like ‘grass is green’ true. This general view of truth is called the ‘truthmaker’ view, which basically says that every truth has a truthmaker. I think the view is basically right. And even if it is not exactly right, I think it at least constitutes the right kind of attitude we should take towards doing metaphysics – an attitude that thinks truth does not come reality-free.
Tuesday, September 5, 2023
On The Validity of Normative Life
Just had another essay published with Epoche, this time on Habermas' discourse ethics. Enjoy:
On the Validity of Normative Life: Habermas' Discourse Ethics
https://epochemagazine.org/64/on-the-validity-of-normative-life-habermas-discourse-ethics/
Saturday, August 19, 2023
The Phenomenological Papers IV: The Malady of Memory
Sunday, June 18, 2023
How to Wield Ockham's Razor (A Dialogue and Commentary)
Unius: ...another benefit of physicalism is that it is more parsimonious than dualism.
Dualis: So what if it is parsimonious? It denies something that is undeniable: the existence of conscious experience.
Unius: Seriously? How many times do I have to say that I am not denying that we have conscious experience? I am just saying that it does not require an autonomous realm of entities to be postulated in order to explain it. Our awareness of the world is physical—just like everything else!
Dualis: Yeah, okay, you say that, but...you know what, whatever, we've had this debate a thousand times. Let's talk about something else. What were you saying about parsimony?
Unius: Okay, sure. All I meant was: putting our explanatory differences aside, would you not admit, at least, that considerations of parsimony count in favour of physicalism?
Dualis: What do you mean? I don't care if something is parsimonious if it denies something fundamental.
Unius: I know, I know, but is it not at least regrettable that you must postulate two kinds of fundamental entity, rather than one? Should we not prefer, if we know absolutely nothing else about two theories, the simpler one?
Friday, April 7, 2023
On Moral Reason
I. In Jeffrie G. Murphy's article "Marxism and Retribution", he accuses Rawls of illegitimately presupposing an unargued for and substantive view about what it is rational for one to do, in setting out his account of justice. This presupposition, then, in part, illegitimately determines the outcome of his theory. More specifically, he argues that it is the presupposition of a (merely) historically contingent form of reason. What does this accusation actually amount to? I take it that this accusation is primarily targeted at Rawls' argument for his principles of justice from the original position.
II. Rawls' original position is a thought experiment that is supposed to bring out our most considered judgements about what justice is, and how we ought to design society. The SEP (because I am not trying to do Rawls' exegesis) describes it as follows:
Tuesday, February 28, 2023
The Phenomenological Papers III: Music, Art for the Soul
This is the third essay in my series, The Phenomenological Papers, a series of essays on similar topics in phenomenology and metaphysics. You can find the first essay here, and the second here. Unlike the first and second essays in this series, this one is completely new and a culmination of a few different things I have been working on and thinking about: metaphysics, phenomenology, and aesthetics, all in one. It is my attempt at a philosophical anthropology as well as something it can hopefully explain: our enjoyment of music. It is perhaps the most enigmatic thing I have written, so hopefully it makes sense to people. I have published it with Epoché so just supply the link. Enjoy!
Music, Art for the Soul
epochemagazine.org/59/music-art-for-the-soul/
Monday, February 6, 2023
Phenomenological Papers II: Art & Self-Consciousness
This is the second essay in my series, The Phenomenological Papers, a series of essays on similar topics. You can find the first essay here. Like the first, this is also an old essay that I have substantively revised, so much so, in fact, that the original is unrecognisable in it. This, and the next essay, will be on something I have long been preoccupied with: the experience of art. Not totally happy with the formulation, but I hope you enjoy.
The universal need for expression in art lies…in man’s rational impulse to exalt the inner and outer world into a spiritual consciousness for himself, as an object in which he recognises his own self. He satisfies the need of this spiritual freedom when he makes all that exists explicit for himself within, and in a corresponding way realises this his explicit self without, evoking thereby, in this reduplication of himself, what is in him into vision and into knowledge for his own mind and that of others.
– G.W.F. Hegel
What do I mean by ‘legitimate’ here? Something is legitimate to us, in this sense, if there is some external validation of its existence by other persons or by an object that is independent of us, not just ourselves or our own impression of things. For example, suppose that at night I see a bright light flash across the sky that is unlike anything I have seen before, but I’m the only one who saw it. In situations like these, we feel torn because no one else was there to validate or invalidate our perception of this flash, nor can it be integrated into our prior beliefs. “Am I crazy, what was that?” you might think. We desire an explanation of this phenomenon because we are certain that it happened, that we saw something, but uncertain why and wish to settle it through some process of external validation. There are a couple of ways this could go. There could be an external explanation or an internal explanation, and it could be validated either by persons, or by further objects.
Monday, January 30, 2023
Rowan Recommends: Reviewing The 2022 Sight and Sound Top 100
Wednesday, January 4, 2023
My Philosophical Views (Answering the 2020 PhilPapers Survey)
In 2020, PhilPapers ran a survey. Here is a description of this survey:
...the 2020 PhilPapers Survey...surveyed the philosophical views of 1785 English-speaking philosophers from around the world on 100 philosophical questions.
The 2020 PhilPapers Survey was a follow-up to the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. The 2020 survey increased the number of the questions from 30 to 100 and expanded the target population.
And here are its results. In this post, I will be writing my own answers to the survey. I will only answer those questions I feel strongly enough about answering. Thus, some will be missing. Given my unorthodox metaphysical views, some of the positions/questions are technically nonsense to me, but I will answer each of those as if they were not. Also, I will include the percentage ratio of people that agree with me (including 'accept' and 'lean toward') in brackets after each answer. It goes without saying that I think some of the questions are badly posed, insufficiently precise, and don't allow for unorthodox views, etc. I am just going to pick what seems right for me. And finally, I am much more confident here than I would be in actually answering it, so I do not have a fully worked-out view of many of these questions. I will post any changes to my views next year! Here goes:
Monday, December 12, 2022
A Dialogue Between (Sigmund) Fre(u)d and Theo(dor Adorno)
The following is a dialogue between a character representing Freud's beliefs about the relationship between society and our psychic life and a character representing Adorno's beliefs on the same thing. Neither character should be read as directly representing the thinker in question, as I am not really that familiar with either. They are only vehicles for discussing a point I have been thinking about while reading Adorno's Minima Moralia. My first foray into the dialogue form, which I have been meaning to do for a while. Probably of limited interest to most, but I had fun...
Fred: ...and that's why I think that the formation and maintenance of society will always require us to substantially curb our instincts and desires. Let me summarise: repression and renunciation of our instinctual life, of our ego, is a condition for the possibility of society at all because of the constitutional inclination of humans towards egoism. Society enforces such repression through the promise of love, the threat of punishment (external authority), and the instilling of guilt in the individual (internal authority). These things are actually good, to some extent. We should align ourselves with the higher social goal of forming a great and successful human community, which requires the renunciation of our instincts and desires rather than the selfish pursuit of our own pleasure. However, this means that, in most cases, the formation of social groups means the aim of happiness for the individual necessarily falls by the wayside. Indeed, I would go further. It almost seems as if the creation of a great human community would be most successful if no attention had been paid to the happiness of the individual at all. This is not as bad as it sounds, though. In individual consciousness, we each act according to the reality principle. The idea is simple: in order to gain some great future pleasure, we defer the gratification of immediate pleasures. Such a principle is constantly at work in our decision-making, and the choice to maintain a society at the expense of our happiness is analogous to this. We put aside our immediate well-being for the sake of something greater than us, society.
Theo: Are you serious about this last bit?
Fred: What do you mean?
Monday, December 5, 2022
The Phenomenological Papers I: Two Sites of Self-Consciousness
A certain inarticulate Self-consciousness dwells dimly in us; which only our Works can render articulate and decisively discernible. Our Works are the mirror wherein the spirit first sees its natural lineaments. Hence, too, the folly of that impossible Precept, Know thyself; till it be translated into this partially possible one, Know what thou canst work at.
— Diogenes Teufelsdröckh
II. What is self-consciousness? Roughly, it is the knowledge of our own individual existence. Now, I could mean this in the trivial sense that we all know we exist. However, this knowledge is without content. I call this formal knowledge. True self-consciousness is not something trivial and without content. Rather, it is knowledge that is actual and embodied. I call this concrete knowledge. Here is an example of this distinction.
Tuesday, September 27, 2022
(Sounds From) The Hole - A Music Newsletter
My friend Liam (author of Mr Paul Desmond) and I are starting a music newsletter on Substack that emails you an album recommendation (and a really short comment on it) every week straight to your inbox. All you have to do is enter your email and it automatically comes to you every week. It will go out every Thursday morning starting this Thursday morning.
You can sign up using this link - I hope you join us!
Friday, July 15, 2022
Philosophising & Living
Thursday, June 30, 2022
Rowan Recommends: 5 Great Albums From 5 Underrated Genres
Thursday, June 9, 2022
Apocryphal Arguments #3: Parmenides & The Way of Truth
This is the third post in a series I'm calling the Apocryphal Arguments series. The idea is to briefly outline, explain, and defend a simple philosophical argument that I think is plausible. It will be in the form of precise premises and conclusions in order to maximise legibility. I aim to post only novel, interesting, and even ridiculous-sounding arguments that might question fundamental sensibilities in order to maximise impact. If all goes to plan each post should be a fun ride.
I want to outline here an
infamous argument, one that seems beyond merely apocryphal. It is an argument that also happens to be
the oldest remaining sustained (and substantive) written argument in the tradition of
western philosophy. (All other works are almost all lost before this period.) It is also the first work of a philosopher that really drew me in, in a way that nothing had before. Thus, I have a particular affinity for it and the careful reader of my metaphysical works will see that its tendrils still reach their way into my thought to this day. Though one (regrettable) disclaimer I have is that it will be rather more obscure than my previous entries in this series. It just fits the bill so well that I couldn’t put it here as merely another post. Thus, if you are a new reader or not that interested in metaphysics, I recommend reading the previous entries in the series, which you can find here and here. You can also read my arguing along Parmenidean lines for a Being of absolute positivity here.
Monday, May 2, 2022
On Fiction and Fantasy
Wednesday, April 27, 2022
Bergson's Theory of Memory
Just had another two essays published with Epoché! These are on Bergson's theory of memory, focusing primarily on chapters two and three of Matter and Memory. His theory has eluded me for some time but I think I really cracked it with this one. Part one goes over the theory itself, how it improves on empiricist theories, the philosophical motivations for it, and the metaphysics of time. The latter will goes over how it solves some outstanding metaphysical issues. Most notably, Bergson's solution to the mind-body problem, which I think is of serious interest. Here they are:
Thursday, March 10, 2022
On Virtue and Goodness
Tuesday, January 25, 2022
A Note on Personal Rationality
I. Bertrand Russell makes a rather funny argument in his thoughtful little essay In Praise of Idleness:
One of the commonest things to do with savings is to lend them to some Government. In view of the fact that the bulk of the public expenditure of most civilised Governments consists in payment for past wars or preparation for future wars, the man who lends his money to a Government is in the same position as the bad men in Shakespeare who hire murderers. The net result of the man’s economical habits is to increase the armed forces of the State to which he lends his savings. Obviously it would be better if he spent the money, even if he spent it in drink or gambling.But, I shall be told, the case is quite different when savings are invested in industrial enterprises. When such enterprises succeed, and produce something useful, this may be conceded. In these days, however, no one will deny that most enterprises fail. That means that a large amount of human labour, which might have been devoted to producing something that could be enjoyed, was expended on producing machines which, when produced, lay idle and did no good to anyone. The man who invests his savings in a concern that goes bankrupt is therefore injuring others as well as himself. If he spent his money, say, in giving parties for his friends, they (we may hope) would get pleasure, and so would all those upon whom he spent money, such as the butcher, the baker, and the bootlegger. But if he spends it (let us say) upon laying down rails for surface cars in some place where surface cars turn out to be not wanted, he has diverted a mass of labour into channels where it gives pleasure to no one. Nevertheless, when he becomes poor through the failure of his investment he will be regarded as a victim of undeserved misfortune, whereas the gay spendthrift, who has spent his money philanthropically, will be despised as a fool and a frivolous person.
Saturday, January 8, 2022
Propositions of Metaphysics
Tuesday, December 14, 2021
Future Contingents in Leibniz
Thursday, December 9, 2021
Contributions to 'On Human Excellence'
This post is a collection of contributions from friends of mine to my earlier essay "On Human Excellence". As I noted in that essay, there is some peculiar utility in using others as evidence of this phenomenon. This is because, more often than not, human excellence as I have defined it is not even perceptible by some, or even most, unless you have some specific expertise or discernment in any given field of practice. Spending hours of one's life dedicated to studying and immersing yourself in some field or craft allows you to get inside its peculiar technical contours. It allows you to better see the excellence in the first place.
Thus, I had the thought that I could solicit those smart and interesting people around me as to whether they had their own thoughts about, or examples of, human excellence. What follows are their ideas and interpretations, meant as an accompaniment to the ideas sketched out in my original essay.
If you read the original essay and these others' essay's and have your own ideas for examples of human excellence, reach out to me and I'd be happy to publish anything here alongside these pieces!
Follow the link provided to read each piece. Here they are, in the order I received them:
Friday, November 12, 2021
On Human Excellence
I. One particularly interesting feature of human reality that exemplifies our dynamism and creativity is the limits and boundaries to which people push their bodies or their craft. Spurred initially by watching the Olympics, I have begun reflecting on the kind of craft involved with being the best in the world at something. There is something enthralling and beautiful to me about watching someone at the very top of their game performing in ways no other human ever has or ever will, in the foreseeable future. This has led me to think about human excellence more generally.
II. Human excellence isn't merely about being good or talented at something, nor about winning some competition, or even about being the best in the world. Human excellence, as I will be using it, is something more than that. It is when craft becomes art. What do I mean by this? Ordinarily, we seem to make a distinction between craft and art, where craft is some skill or practice and art is a product, imbued with the aesthetic imprint of an artist. Thus, what I take to be human excellence is when some craft itself becomes art. Rather than being merely the process that produces something, acting out the craft becomes itself its own aesthetic product. Human excellence is the peculiar aesthetic quality some skill takes on when it is performed at such a high level, to the point that it seems effortless, and utterly one-of-a-kind.
Tuesday, October 19, 2021
Apocryphal Arguments #2: Radical Enfranchiement
I present in this post a funny little argument that states that we are rationally obliged to abolish the voting age. In other words, that there is never a justification for disenfranchising citizens based on age. The apocryphal part of the argument is that this includes young children, toddlers, and even newborns. I make the argument by using a kind of slippery slope argument, often used by detractors of child enfranchisement. (The style of argumentation will be similar to my last entry in this series, so I highly recommend you read that first, here, if you haven't already.) This argument might supply the dumbest reason you could come up with to abolish the voting age, but here we are. This is a shortened version of a longer and more careful essay I have on this. Let's get to it.
Monday, September 20, 2021
A Theory of Friction (For Bayesian Epistemology)
Saturday, August 28, 2021
New Essay With Epoché
In which I attempt to reconstruct Bergson's views on free will, as presented in Time and Free Will in light of the later changes in his ontology. (Makes a nice companion piece with my previous piece on him outlining that ontology.) Check it out!
Rebel Without a Cause - Reconstructing Free Will in Bergson
https://epochemagazine.org/43/rebel-without-a-cause-reconstructing-free-will-in-bergson/
Friday, July 2, 2021
The Tendency to Know
I. I have a theory that human knowledge is analogically like the second law of thermodynamics and entropy. However, it is not that systems of human knowledge tend towards disorder or less knowledge, but instead towards more knowledge. This is not the entropy of Claude Shannon's information theory, in which there is a stochastic rate of loss in the transmission of information. It is rather a theory about how knowledge proliferates in closed social systems (at any scale). I begin by defining the second law of thermodynamics and entropy as I understand them and pointing out how certain parts of a system defy the law (local reversals) even though the system as a whole tends towards an increase in entropy. Next, I outline by analogy how I think a system structured like entropy occurs in systems of human knowledge. Finally, I close with some remarks on Charles Sanders Peirce, who ultimately sowed the seeds of this idea. If you understand entropy and thermodynamics already, you can skip to section three.
Monday, June 21, 2021
Apocryphal Arguments #1: A Rocking Universe
Sunday, June 13, 2021
A Critique of Negation
Tuesday, June 8, 2021
Double Feature Series #3: Sex, Love, & Jealousy
This is the third post in what I'm calling my Double Feature Series, in which I post a pairing of two movies that I love. These movies will usually be made 20+ years apart and are thematically related somehow. I try to draw out these connections, and in doing so, bring two seemingly disconnected films together, into one thought.
The third entry in this series, as the title indicates, pulls together two films about relationships. They are:
Thursday, April 29, 2021
Epoché Author!
Tuesday, March 23, 2021
A Sketch of Similarities Between Bergson and Heidegger
There is a remarkable similarity between the philosophies of Bergson and Heidegger. Bergson's notion of the body as a 'centre of action' and Heidegger's notion of Dasein as "that entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue" get at this similarity. In both cases, the being is entirely immanent and contiguous with reality; that is, they are merely a part of a larger set of environmental relations (extensity for Bergson, Being for Heidegger).
In their formulation of this aspect of their metaphysics, they both stringently avoid mentioning an inextended consciousness or inextended representations in the form of perception. Instead, they favour a relation that is continuous with its environment. They both want to repudiate a certain kind of dualism or subjective atomism that postulates the observer as a metaphysical island from which we peep at the world through a tiny hole. They prefer to analyse the body in terms of its direct and practical engagement with the world.
What makes humans peculiar for both thinkers is the self-consciousness of our being-in-the-world. We ask the question of being to ourselves and end up thinking we are of a unique kind, which is partially true, in that we seem to be the only kind of thing really asking, but partially false, in that we obviously are extensions of the world.
Bergson reduces perception from a faculty of representation and knowledge to an evolved and fine-tuned faculty for carving up and abstractly select those elements of the fluid world that practically benefit each organism and grant the freedom to navigate the world and itself as it needs to. Heidegger historicises and relativises what beings there are to that which Dasein has as its concern and to the historical epoch or cultural moment in which beings are revealed.
In both cases, the intellectual activity of objectifying the world, the thing that makes us think we grasp Being most intimately, for Bergson 'the intellect', for Heidegger 'ready-to-hand', paradoxically distances us from a true metaphysics - of duration, or Being, respectively. Both reject the presence (in the Derridean sense) of (small-b) beings. Only the former thinks we can go beyond this and intuit this true metaphysic.
Ultimately I think that Bergson ends up giving a more satisfying picture of metaphysics proper (though I am still grappling with his views about memory which make a surprisingly good candidate for a sort of soul). My problem with Heidegger is that he never seems to really escape Kant while I think Bergson really does.
Sunday, September 6, 2020
Objects Aren't Real (Vagueness as Process)
Thursday, September 3, 2020
Rowan Recommends: 5 Great Performances by Women in Film (with Honourable Mentions)
Friday, August 7, 2020
21 Dumb & Boring Reflections on Politics and Moral Philosophy
1
Sunday, July 5, 2020
Balancing the Self With Kierkegaard
Tuesday, June 9, 2020
When Do Friendships Last
"Being-with-one-another in the they is not at all a self-contained, indifferent side-by-sideness, but a tense, ambiguous keeping track of each other, a secretive, reciprocal listening-in. Under the mask of the for-one-another, the against one-another is at play."
The maxim:
Wednesday, April 22, 2020
Heidegger, Disney & David Lynch
Friday, January 24, 2020
A Certain Lightness
He who says, "Better go without belief forever than believe a lie!" merely shows his own preponderant private horror of becoming a dupe. He may be critical of many of his desires and fears, but this fear he slavishly obeys...It is like a general informing his soldiers that it is better to keep out of battle forever than to risk a single wound...Our errors are surely not such awfully solemn things. In a world where we are so certain to incur them in spite of all our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems healthier than this excessive nervousness on their behalf
Thursday, January 16, 2020
Commitment
Thursday, January 2, 2020
Rowan Recommends: Summer Interlude (1951)
Monday, December 30, 2019
Quick, Dirty, and Dismissive Movie Reviews for the New Year
Thursday, November 28, 2019
The Serious Stance
Monday, November 11, 2019
Double Feature Series #2: Mob Justice
The second entry in this series illustrates the temporal possibilities of influence we see in film! They are two quite harrowing movies about the dangers of mob justice, directed by Fritz Lang and Thomas Vinterberg respectively:
Thursday, October 31, 2019
On Vagueness
Monday, October 21, 2019
On 'Old Moralists'
That tartuffery, as stiff as it is virtuous, of old Kant as he lures us along the dialectical by paths which lead, more correctly, mislead, to his ‘categorical imperative’ - this spectacle makes us smile, we who find no little amusement in observing the subtle tricks of old moralists and moral-preachers.